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In the past, the states employing the Grand Jury system have
experienced a vast multitude of perplexing problems. Each day ingenious
defense counsel conceive new technicalities upon which to take advantage
of delaying the expeditious handling of cases at the Grand Jury Stage
of proceeding.
Many authorities have said that the Grand Jury should be abolished
in toto; the "raison d'etre" has long since departed. Yet, has the day
arrived where we can abandon this democratic institution and rely on
politically appointed officers to perform its functions? These safeguards
were obtained in our criminal jurisprudence slowly, by battle and sacrifice.
Most of the criticisms of the Grand Jury System could be alleviated by
the impaneling of more competent men to serve as Grand Jurors.
The Florida Statutes arc a major step in the right direction. No
Grand Jury in this country can boast of having the facilities that are
presently available to the Florida Grand Juries. True, there are dangers
of infiltration into this body by criminals and incompetents, but this
is true of any democratic institution. A vigilant "public eye" is necessary
to make certain that such a condition does not come to pass. By having
competent jurors and making them aware of their tremendous powers,
the Grand Jury can become the greatest single force in our community
for decent local government. At the same time it will keep the prosecution
of the people by the people.
HUBERT G. ROBERTS
NONBUSINESS BAD DEBTS-IS THE TAXPAYER
GETTING THE BUSINESS?
THE PROBLEM
With all taxable years beginning after December 31, 1942, the
taxpayer who had suffered bad debts was faced with a problem. This
problem was created by Section 124(a) of the Revenue Act of 1942'
which added a new concept to federal tax law-the nonbusiness debt.2
The breakdown of existing bad debts into two different classes was
required by this new concept. The individual" taxpayer had to determine
whether his bad debt came under the general rule4 of business bad debts
1. 56 STAT. 798 (1942).
2. The pertinent provision has been incorporated into the code as IrT. REV. CODE§ 23 (k)(4).
3. INT. REv. CODE § 23 (k)(4) expressly provides that corporate taxpayers are
not covered by its terms.
4. INT. REV. CODE § 23 (k)(1) [which provides for the general deduction against
ordinary income of any bad debts becoming worthless within the taxable year subject
to enumerated exceptions such as Section 23 (k) (4)1.
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or under the new rule for nonbusiness bad debts. If it were a nonbusiness
debt, the loss resulting therefrom was treated as a short-term capital loss,
i.e., in the absence of other capital transactions, the capital loss could be
offset against ordinary income only to the extent of $1,000.00 in any one
taxable year.' Likewise, a nonbusiness debt is not deductible when found
to be "partially worthless," while the business bad debt may be deducted
to the extent that it does become worthless.0
The advantage in treating the debt under the general rule is
obvious,-there is an immediate one hundred per cent deduction from
ordinary income in the year the bad debt occurs with no limitations of
the capital loss carry-over.7 The business bad debt is also included within
the provisions of the operating loss carry-over 8 section. In the alternative,
if classified as a nonbusiness debt, there is an offset against long-term
capital gain income taxable at the maximum twenty-six percntum rate.9
In defining a nonbusiness debt, Congress said that:
The term 'non-business' debt means a debt other than a debt
evidenced by a security ...and other than a debt the loss from
which the worthlessness of which is incurred in the taxpayer's
trade or business.'0
This definition was explained to the taxpayer by the Treasury Department,
in its regulations,1 as follows:
b) The character of the debt for this purpose is not controlled
by the circumstances attending its creation or its subsequent
acquisition by the taxpayer or by the use to which the borrowed
funds are put by the recipient, but is to be determined by the
relation which the loss resulting from the debts becoming worthless
bears to the trade or business of the taxpayer. If that relation
is a proximate one in the conduct of the trade or business in
which the taxpayer is engaged at the time the debt becomes worth-
less, the debt is not a non-business debt for the purposes of this
section. (Emphasis supplied).
Paragraph (c) of the regulation goes on to illustrate six examples of debts
that have or have not a proximate relation to the taxpayer's trade or
business when the loss from the debt occurs.' 2
5. INT. REv. CoDE §§ 23 (k)(4), 117 (d)(2).
6. INT. REV. CODE § 23 (k)(1). The Revenue Act of 1921 (42 STAT. 227,
1921) was the first act to permit the use of the reserve method to scientifically provide
for estimated bad debts.
7. INr. REV. CODE § 117 (e).
8. IT. REV. CODE § 122 (d)(5).
9. INT. REV. CODE § 117 (c)(l)(B).
10. INT. REV. CODE § 23 (k)(4).
11. U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23 (k)-6 (1943), as amended by T.D. 5458, 1945
Cumu. Bu.. 45 [which adopts the language of the House Ways and Means Committee
I.R. RE.. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1948)].
12. An example of which is illustration (1) in which A sells his business.
retains an account receivable. The worthlessness of this account is treated as a nonbusiness
bad debt.
COMMENTS
However, much of this harsh treatment has been alleviated by the
proposed Revenue Act of 1954. In a press release dated January 22,
1954, the House Ways and Means Committee announced:
At present a business bad debt is limited to a debt which becomes
bad while the taxpayer is carrying on a trade or business. A
committee provision" treats a bad debt as a business bad debt
if the debt was incurred in a business even though the taxpayer
was not carrying on the business when the debt became bad. 1"
The proposed bill, 15 as stated in the Committee Report, excludes from
the definition of a nonbusiness bad debt, any debt, either created in the
course of the trade or business of the taxpayer or acquired by him in the
course thereof without regard to the relationship of the debt to a trade
or business of the taxpayer at the time that the debt became worthless,
This is an addition to the present exclusion of a debt becoming worthless
in the course of the trade or business of the taxpayer.16
In all events, under the present law or under the proposed law, the
problem of interpreting "trade or business" remains, and will continue
to vex the practitioner. The term "trade or business" has been found in
the Internal Revenue Code from the Code's inception, and it has received
many interpretations."
The Treasury Department attempts to clarify the meaning of "trade or
business" as the phrase appears in Section 23(k) (4) of the Internal Revenue
Code. The regulations state:
The question whether a debt is one the loss from the worthlessness
of which is incurred in the taxpayer's trade or business is a question
of fact in each particular case. The determination of this
question is substantially the same as that which is made for the
purpose of ascertaining whether a loss from the type of transaction
covered by section 23(e) is "incurred in trade or business" under
section 23(e) (1).is
However, to fully understand the judicial construction of the more
recent cases, it is necessary to refer to an early Court definition of the
term "business" as it appeared in another tax law.
13. H. R. 8300, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1954) § 166 (d)(2)(B) [wherein a
nonbusiness debt is defined as a "debt created or acquired (as the case may be)
in connection with a taxpayer's trade or business" as opposed to the existing § 23 (k) (4)
". .. from the worthlessness of which is incurred in the taxpayer's trade or business."
(emphasis supplied) ].
14. 4 P-H 1954 FED. TAx SERv. 66,543 (1954).
15. This comment was prepared in early April, 1954 after the passage of House
Bill 8300 but prior to any Senate action on The Revenue Act of 1954.
16. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1954). In the general explanation,
the Committee specifically tells how the result of illustration (I) of the existing
Regulations, op. cit. supra notes I1 and 12, will be reversed.
17. E.g., Daily Journal Co. v. CIR, 135 F.2d 687, 688 (9th Cir. 1943); Fackler
v. CIR, 133 F.2d 509, 510 (6th Cir. 1943); See Harding v. United States, 113 F. Supp.
A4C. 463 (Ct. Cl. 1953) (where the Commissioner adopted inconsistent stands as to
Lherinrmaning of "trade or business" in an identical fact situation).
18. U. S. Treas. Reg. 118, § 39.23 (k)-6 (1943).
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TE HISTORY
In 1911, Mr. Justice Day, speaking for the court in Flint v. Stone
Tracy Co."' said, "Business is a very comprehensive term and embraces
every thing about which a person can be employed." Six years later, in
Von Baumnbach v. Sargent Land Co.,20 the court again approved this broad
definition.
By 1932, however, the court undertook to limit this all inclusive
definition.2' A taxpayer sought to deduct the cost of worthless stock
of insolvent corporations which had been organized by him to exploit
his inventions. The court held, "Ownership of all the stock is not enough
to show that creation and management of the corporation was a part of
his ordinary business."22  The rationale that the "business" of the
corporation was separate and distinct from the "business" of its sole stock-
holder, was based upon the separate entity doctrine then prevailing.23
In Deputy v. Du Pont,2 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in a concurring
opinion, defined-carrying on any trade or business-to mean the "holding
of one's self out to others as engaged in the selling of goods and
services." It remained for Mr. Justice Reed, in lHiggins v. C.I.R.,25 to
state that the definition of "business" as used in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.
is not controlling in a dissimilar inquiry. Since the dcfinition originally
given to "business" in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. involved the issue of certain
corporations coming under the Corporation Tax Law 26 which levied a tax
on corporations engaged in business, it can be readily seen that Mr.
Justice Day's definition is all but expressly overruled for current tax
purposes.
The court through Mr. Justice Reed in the Higgins case said:
Only those are deductible which relate to carrying on a business. 7
To determine whether the activities of a taxpayer are 'carrying on
a business' requires an examination of the facts in each case ....
all expenses of every business transaction are not deductible.
The present rule for determining what constitutes trade or business
seems to be Mr. Justice Reed's statement fliat each case is decided on its
own individual facts, tempered by IMr. Justice Frankfurter's definition in
the concurring opinion. Various factual situations do exist along -with
19. 220 U.S. 107, 171 (1911).
20. 242 U.S. 503 (1917).
21. Dalton v. Bowers, 287 U.S. 404 (1932); Burnet v. Clark, 287 U.S. 410 (1932).
22. Dalton v. Bowers, 287 U.S. 404, 410 (1932).
23. See New Colonial Ice Co. v. ltelvering, 292 U.S. 435, 442 (1934).
24. 308 U.S. 488, 499 (1940).
25. 312 U.S. 212 (1941).
26. 36 S'rA' . It, § 38 (1909).
The court, through Mr. Justice Recd in the Higgins case said:
To determine whether the activities of a taxpayer arc 'carrying
on a business' requires an examination of the facts in each case ....
all expenses of every business transaction are not deductible,
27. Higgins v. CIR, 312 U.S. 212, 217 (1941).
COMMENTS
several dissimilar rulings of law on what appear to be similar factual
situations.
With the view in mind that a taxpayer can be engaged in more than
one trade or business,28 a study of the cases defining "trade or business"
as it pertains to business bad debts, is now in order.
TuE FACTS
Prior to 1934, deductions for losses -a and bad debts30 were thought
to be interchangeable.3 ' In the Spring City Foundry case,3 2 it was stated
that Sections 23(e) and 23(k) of the Internal Revenue Code are mutually
exclusive. However, in determining whether the loss or the debt
is attributable to the trade or business of the taxpayer, the definition of
"trade or business" is the same.33
There is general agreement that the business of the corporation is
not the business of its stockholders or officers, Nevertheless, as the
taxpayer becomes interested in many corporations, as he takes a stronger
financial and managerial interest in them, his loans to these organizations
may be said to occur within the course of his trade or business as a
promoter of business enterprises. ' ' The Higgins case held that the full
time management of one's investments of securities does not constitute
a trade or business, so a gray area appears to exist; the cloudy area being,
the distinction between the active investor and the passive financier. 6
Bad debts that represented the partial purchase price of scats on an
exchange, and which arose out of partnership agreements were held to
have a proximate relationship to the business of the taxpayer.7 These
cases are of importance because they appear to allow a partner to deduct
a bad debt that has arisen out of partnership activity, as a business bad
28. Birch Ranch & Oil Co. v. CIR, 152 1.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1946); Bo'a v. Keith,
257 Fed. 133 (E.D. N.Y. 1919); T.D. 1989, 16 'FxRns. DiEc. 83 (1914); I.1. 2751,
XIII-! Ci'. BULL. 43 (1934).
29. INT. Rrv. CoDE § 23 (e)(2).
30. INT. Rnv. CoDE § 23 (k)(l),
31. See Bank of London and South America Ltd., 17 B.T.A. 1263 (1929). acq.,
X-2 CuM. BULL. 4 (1931) (Both the Commissioner and the taxpayer argued that
the alleged loss was and was not, either a bad debt or loss, making no distinction between
the two concepts).
32. Spring City Foundry Co. v. CIR, 292 U.S. 182 (1934); Charles G. Berwind,
20 T. C. No. 114 (1953).
33. See U. S. Treas. Reg. IS, § 39.23 (k)-6 (1943) quoted in the body of this
comment.
34. Van Dyke v. CIR, 291 U.S. 642 (1933); Burnet v. Clark, 287 U.S. 410 (1932);
Dalton v. Bowers, 287 U.S. 404 (1932); Omaha Nat. Batk v. CIR, 183 F.2d 899(8th Cir. 1950); Fred A. Iihlnaier, 17 T.C. 620 (1951), acq.. 1952-1 CUm. BULL. 1
(1953); Jan. C. J. Boisservain, 17 T.C. 325 (1951). But cf. CIR v. People's Pittsburg
Trust Co., 60 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1932); Ralph C. Holmes, 37 B.T.A. 865 (1938).
35. See CIR v. Stokes' Estate, 200 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 19"3); Maloney v. Spencer,
172 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1949); Jacob Mark, P-1l 1951 TC M~Lm. D:c. 51, 225, 10
TCM 702 (1951); Henry Sage, 15 T.C. 299 (1950), acq., 1951-1 Cis. BULL. 3 (1951);
Valentine E. Macy, P-H 1949 tc MrzM. DEc. 49, 009, 8 TCNI 713 (1949);
Vincent C. Campbell, 11 T.C. 510 (1948), acq., 1949-1 CuM. BULL. 1 (1949).
36. See Foss v. CIR, 75 F.2d 326, 328 (1935).
37. Harding v. United States, 113 F. Supp. 461 (Ct. C1. 1953); Robert Cluett III,
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debt. Query: if the partners can deduct the debt severally, why can the
individual not deduct the debt if it arises from a similar 'business' trans-
action arising from the taxpayer's corporate activities? 8
In reviewing the cases, it is interesting to note that in close situations,
where the Tax Court finds the making of loans to a corporation to be
the trade or business of the taxpayer, the Tax Court treats additional
advances in succeeding years after the debt was first determined to be
worthless (by the taxpayer), as capital contributions.30 Another 'debt'
that is not deductible as a business bad debt is the satisfaction of a moral
obligation; i.e. a debt not legally binding on the taxpayer.40
The main point of contention appears to be in those situations where
the taxpayer is one who promotes, organizes, invests in, directs, manages
a number of enterprises, and (in the course of his alleged "business
activity") makes a loan to one of the enterprises.
In such situations, the taxpayer is usually occupied with one principal
business and finds great difficulty in meeting his burden4' of proving that
the various loans were made in the course of another trade or business
in which he is also occupied; the promotion of business enterprises. A
strong positive definition of what constitutes a "promoter of businesses"
has never been judicially derived, although there have been some
indications as to the characteristics of a "promoter." 42
The Commissioner has taken the stand that making loans to sundry
businesses is not a usual business activity of any taxpayer, unless that
taxpayer is regularly engaged in the business of making loans. 3 He has
recognized exceptions, 44 but regularly seems to reclassify business bad
debts deductions to non-business bad debt deductions when they involve
a debt of the taxpayer's corporation. The Tax Court has frequently taken
8 T.C. 1178, acq., 1947-2 CuM. BULL. 2 (1947); ci. Isaac P. Keeler, 23 B.T.A. 467
(1931).
38. See Guterman, Some Problems in the Deductions for Bad Debts, 63 HARv. L.
REv. 832, 834 (1950).
39. O.D. Bratton, P-lI 1953 TC ME:im. D c. 53, 241. 12 TCM 747 (1953);
Fred A. Bihlmaer, 17 T.C. 620 (1951), acq., 1952-1 CuM. BULL. 1 (1952). See
Lander v. Self, Civil No. 1985, E.D. Ark., Oct 23, 1950, 4-PUT 1951 FE. TAx SERv.
72, 522 (1951) (The judge instructed the jury to determine: If an advance to a
corporation was to protect the taxpayer's investment, the loss was a capital loss; if the
advance was intended to be a loan, the loss would be deductible in full as a loan. The
jury found that the taxpayer's intent was that the advance be treated as a loan, and
judgment was given on the taxpayer's intent.)
40. Friedman v. Delaney, 171 F.2d 269 (1st Cir. 1948); W. A. Dallmeyer, 14
T.C. 1282, acq., 1950-2 CUM. BULL. 2 (1950) [in such situations, deductions also
are not allowable under Section 23 (e) (2)).
41. New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvening, 292 U.S. 435 (1934), approved, White
v. United States, 305 U.S. 281 (1938); Redman v. CIR 155 F.2d 319 (1st Cir. 1946);
Cittadine v. CIR 139 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1943).
42. A. Kingsley Ferguson, 16 T.C. 1248, 1257-1258 (1951) (where Judge Disney
discusses the characteristics of a promoter).
43. See Henry E. Sage, 15 T.C. 299, 303 (1950), acq., 1951-1 Cum. BULL. 3
(1951).
44. Henry E, Sage, 15 T.C. 299 (1950), acq., 1951-1 Cum. BULL. 3 (1951);
Vincent C. Campbell, 11 T.C. 510 (1948), acq., 1947-1 CuM. BULL. 1 (1949) (Both
COMMENTS
the liberal view that the making of loans to business enterprises, in the
course of a taxpayer's business of promoting business enterprises"B or for
other business purposes,4" is the incurring of a debt that is deductible under
Section 23(k) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code.
Judge Tietjens of the Tax Court has proposed to further extend
the Tax Court's liberal rule by stating that a:
*. .. taxpayer can be engaged in the business of organizing,
operating, and financing a single corporation as well as a number
of corporations and that a taxpayer so engaged . . . should be
entitled to the same bad debt treatment.
This view was expressed in the dissent in the Ferguson ease,47 the appeal
of which is now pending before the Sixth Circuit.
The line presently is drawn between "passive investors' 48 and "active
financiers." 40  The Smith ease"0 involved one of five equal stockholders
in a Canadian fanning corporation, who had made disproportionate loans
to the corporation. The taxpayer, the general manager of a Buffalo
department store, devoted his weekends to the management of the farm.
Upon the bankruptcy of the corporation, the Canadian Bankruptcy Court
treated these advances as a secondary type debt, inferior to the claims of
outside creditors, but superior to the capital: 1 In rejecting the taxpayer's
contention that he was an active manager of business enterprises, the
Court of Appeals in reversing the Tax Court, adopted judge Disney's
dissent 2 and noted that since the taxpayer was not regularly engaged in
loaning money to businesses (the view of the Commissioner), the debt was
not attributable to any trade or business of the taxpayer.
In the Washburn'3 case, the taxpayer, a retired attorney, organized
a number of enterprises in different industries. He actively managed
the various companies that were exploiting timber lands; he organized a
railroad to develop the timber lands, but was forced to sell the railroad
stock at a loss. In rejecting the taxpayer's attempt to carry over the loss,
eases acquiesed to by the Commissioner involve taxpayers, whose trade or business did
not consist of loaning money. Sage was a promoter; Campbell was in the coal business.)
45. Weldon D. Smith, 17 T.C. 135 (1951), rev'd, 203 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1953);
Estate of J. Stogdell Stokes, P-H 1951 TC Mi.M. DE.c. 51, 343, 10 TCM 1111
(1951), aff'd, 200 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1953); Jacob Mark, P-!t 1951 TC MEM. DEC.
51, 225, 10 TCM 702 (1951). But cf., A. Kingsley Ferguson, 16 T.C. 1248 (1951).
46. Jacob Mark, P-H 1951 TC Mem. DEC. 51, 225, 10 TCM 702 (1951);
Henry E. Sage, 15 T.C. 299 (1950), acq., 1951-1 Cm. BuL.. 3 (1951); Vincent C.
Campbell, 11 T.C. 510 (1948), acq., 1949-1 CuM. BULL. 1 (1949).
47. A. Kingsley Ferguson, 16 T.C. 1248, 1259 (1951). Judge Murdock joined in
the dissent.
48. Weldon 1). Smith v. CIR, 203 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 74
Sup. Ct. 27 (1953); Omaha Nat. Bank v. CIR, 183 F.2d 899 (8th Cir. 1950),
affirming sub. nor., L. F. Crofoot, P-H 1949 TC Nkiiru. I)ac. 49, 236, 8 TCM
(1949).
49. See notes 45 and 46 supra.
50. 203 F.Zd 310 (2d Cir. 1953).
51. Weldon D. Smith, 17 T.C. 135, 141 (1951).
52. Id. at 147.
53. 51 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1931).
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the Board of Tax Appeals was "unable to find therein the 'operation
of any trade or business regularly carried on.'"s On the basis of several
decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit, reversed the decision and held the taxpayer to be in
the business of managing his investments. The aforementioned B.T.A.
decisions were handed down subsequent to the decision of the B.T.A.
in the Washburn case, but prior to the Court of Appeals decision and
were predicated upon Mr. Justice Day's broad definition in Flint v. Stone
Tracy Co. The Treasury Department announced its non-acquiescence
to all the B.T.A. decisions. 5',
Another decision of the Eighth Circuit casts some doubt on the
\Vashburn decision. It is factually distinguishable, however. In Omaha
National Bank v. C.I.R.56 the taxpayer attorney "protected his investment"
by incorporating a restaurant that was then under construction. He was
then joined by the promoter (the original debtor) of the restaurant as a
fellow stockholder and proceeded to look solely to the corporation for
the repayment of the loan originally made to the promoter as an individual.
The court held that the debt was not incurred in the trade or business of
the taxpayer on the grounds that the corporation was a separate entity from
the taxpayer and the business of the corporation is not the business of
the taxpayer.
In the Omaha Nat'l Bank case the Eighth Circuit has not overruled
Vashburn but distinguishes a hopeless fact situation. The Washburn
case is probably still the law under our present limited definition of
"busincss". 57  It has bccn asserted that the rcccnt Smith decision is in
conflict with the older \'ashburn decision, and that the Supreme Court
should have granted certiorari to clarify the rule.r8 With the refusal of
the Supreme Court to grant certiorari,-9 the question remains unanswered.
54. 1. L. Washburn, 16 B.T.A. 1091, 1095 (1929), non-acq., X-2 C1om. BULL.
105 (1931).
55. \Vashburn v. CIR, 51 I.2d 949, 954-955 (Sth Cir. 1931) wherein is cited
Glen M. Avarill, 20 B.T.A. 1196 (1930), nonacq., X-2 Cum. BULL. 80 (1931);
E. 1). Anthony, 20 B.T.A. 5 (1930), non-acq., X-2 GUM. BuLL. 79 (1939); Elmore
L. Potter, 18 B.T.A. 549 (1929), non-acq., X-2 CUM. BULL. 97 (1939); V. 11.
Ostcnbcig, 17 B.T.A. 738 (1929), non-acq., X-2 Cum. BULL. 97 (1939); Edward I1.
Baker, 17 B.T.A. 733 (1929), non-acq., X-2 Cum. BULL. 80 (1931); T. I. Crane,
17 B.T.A. 733 (1929), non-acq., X-2 Cum,. BuLL. 84 (1931).
56. 183 F.2d 899 (8th Cir. 1950).
57. This view is based on the followilg recent cases: Maloney v. Spencer, 172
F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1949); Henry E. Sage, 15 T.C. 299 (1950), acq., 1951-1 Cum.
Bm.L. 1 (1951); Vincent C. Campbell, 11 T.C. 510 (1948), acq., 1949-1 Cuss. BULL.
1 (1949). The two Tax Court cases are based on the \Vashburn decision, but the
Maloney case does not cite Washburn and holds that the regularity of the taxpayer's
activities, gives them the status of a "trade or business." The fact that the Commissioner
acquiesced in the two Tax Court Cases indicates a trend that the Commisioner accepts
a wider test to determine the trade or business of the taxpayer. The facts of the
\Vashburn case are analogous to all three cases.
58. 2 CCH 1954 Fla. TAx Rv,. 213 A (1954) (by implication).
59. Weldon D. Smith v. CIR, 74 Sup. Ct. 27 (1953).
60. 172 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1949).
COMMENTS
In Maloney v. Specer,60 the Ninth Circuit upheld tie District
Judge's decision0' in a case involving the obligations of the taxpayer's
corporation which he was operating as packing plants. The court hcld
that the taxpayer was engaged in the regular business of acquiring,
leasing and equipping food proccssing plants, and the bad "debts" as they
were recorded on the books of both the corporation and the taxpayer, were
deductible under the general rule. The court emphasized the "regularity
of the taxpayer's activities" as opposed to the "isolated or occasional
transactions."'62
The Third Circuit held that in a case where an individual organizes
corporations to exploit patents, a debt involving one of these corporations
is an expense of the taxpayer's regular business .3 The First Circuit held
that a person of property who actively manages both the property and
the corporation in which his property is invested is carrying on business
within the statute. 4 While the latter decision was based on 'ashburn,
it is an approving opinion of the Eighth Circuit's reasoning.
By a count of the circuits, it appears that the active participation
of a stockholder in his corporate activities is likened to the carrying out
of a trade or business. The Smith case seems to be distinguishable factually
in that Smith was a "passive investor," but a closer examination of the
cases shows that, there, the court approved the Commissioner's contention
that the taxpayer must be regularly engaged in the business of making
loans.
The Leo L. Pollak", case does pose a possible solution to the taxpayer's
dilemnia. There the taxpayer endorsed the corporation's notes and
was required to pay the notes when the corporation became insolvent.
The Tax Court rejected the taxpayer's argument that there was no debt
owing to the taxpayer by the corporation until the taxpayer began to make
payments to the bank. The corporation, the taxpayer contended, being
hopelessly insolvent, was incapable of owing a debt for tax purposes at
the time the taxpayer's payments to the bank were made. The payments,
argued the taxpayer, were in the nature of a loss deductible under Section
23 (e) (2) of the Internal Revenue Code; i.e., a transaction entered into
for profit. The Tax Court, in rejecting the argument, stated that the lack
of the debtor's assets controlled the situation. The inon-existence of the
debtor and the taxpayer's argument of Section 23 (c) (2) were inapplicable.
The Court of Appeals reversed, pointing out that the payments were
made in fulfillment of pre-existing legal obligation, and not because of
any present expectation of repayment by the principal debtor. The
61. Spencer v. Maloney, 73 F. Supp. 657 (D. Ore. 1947).
62. Burnet v. Clark, 287 U.S. 410 (1932); Dalton v. Bowers, 287 U.S. 404 (1932).
63. CIR v. Stokes' Estate, 200 F.2d 636 (3d Cir. 1953).
64. Foss v. CIR, 75 F.2d 326 (1st Cir. 1935).
65. Leo L. Pollak, 20 T.C. 211 (1953), rev'd, 209 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 19S4).
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pre-existing legal obligation was found to be a transaction entered into
for a profit. This decision was based on the doctrine of Eckert v. Burnetr
in which Mr. Justice Holmes announced that payments on an endorsed
note are deductible only in the year the payments are made, not in the
year the notes go into default.
In deciding the Pollak case, the Third Circuit approves Allen v.
Edwards,"7 a case which shows the extent this doctrine, if successful, can
be used to avoid the harsh treatment of Section 23 (k) (4). It should be
noted that Sections 23 (e) and 23 (k) are mutually exclusive; 8 in order
to apply the Pollak rule, the obligee corporation must be totally unable to
ever repay the notes made good by the endorser.
CONCLUSION
It would seem then, that if the "passive investor" guarantees bank
loans to his favored corporations instead of making them himself, he is
assured more favorable tax treatment in the event of a corporate failure.
This inequality in the treatment of taxpayers who do not have the
machinery to arrange for a third party to make an advance to the
corporation, either through lack of counsel or because of a very immediate
need for funds, can best be rectified by a clear expression of legislative
intent broadening the definition of "business" as it pertains to the bad
debt section.
If the present Pollak case be approved, the term "trade or business"
as used in Section 23 (e) will differ from its meaning in Section
23 (k) (4). This is not the intention of Congress., '
Should the Pollak case and its approval of Allen v. Edwards0 prevail,
a modification of Section 23 (k) (4) will be in order. Section 23 (k) (4)
was initially enacted to prevent the abuse of deducting loans that were
made with no expectation of being repaid.7 1 The section is now being
applied to restrict the one man corporation. It is respectfully recommended
that any debt arising from a taxpayer's business activity (as used in the
broadest meaning) be deductible in full.
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